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747 
U.S. FOREIGN AID REFORM:  
CHANGING INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN 
ORDER TO MEET MODERN DAY NEEDS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since America’s initial foreign aid effort following World War II, 
foreign aid has played an increasingly important part in shaping America’s 
international role. Developing countries that rely on foreign aid play an 
integral role in our economic success. Americans increasingly see human 
suffering as an issue that transcends national boundaries and that can be 
alleviated with foreign aid. While the validity of using foreign aid for both 
of these issues has not been seriously challenged, people have recently 
raised concerns about the effectiveness of foreign aid. With well-
publicized scandals, such as the United Nations Oil-for-Food program,
1
 
and unease over the possibility of foreign aid enriching dictatorial leaders 
at the expense of the intended recipients of the aid,
2
 it is time to rethink 
how we allocate foreign aid and ensure its effectiveness. 
This Note will attempt to trace the evolution of America’s foreign aid 
policy to the modern day and offer solutions for the entrenched problems 
of our current foreign aid setup. First, it will explain the genesis of our 
current foreign aid setup in post-World War II reconstruction and how that 
changed through the Cold War. Second, it will provide the current legal 
framework in which our foreign aid operates. Third, it will explain the 
limitations and problems that result from our distribution of foreign aid. 
Finally, it will offer a solution: the creation of country-specific and 
regional coordinators who are responsible for distributing and overseeing 
foreign aid to ensure it meets our goals. 
II. HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN AID: FROM POST-WORLD WAR II 
EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION TO POST-Y2K DEVELOPING COUNTRY 
DESTRUCTION 
The first major attempt at foreign aid in America came as a result of 
World War II. While Europe was in shambles, America had a resurgent 
 
 
 1. Mark Gregory, Companies In ‘Oil-for-Food Scam’, BBC NEWS, Nov. 19, 2004, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4025057.stm.  
 2. Sharon Lafraniere, Donor Mistrust Worsens AIDS in Zimbabwe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2004, 
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE1D9163FF931A2575BC0A9629 
C8B63&n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/Subjects/F/Foreign%20Aid. 
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economy and growing prosperity.
3
 In the shadow of the emerging Cold 
War, the United States sought to further its alliances with Europe by 
helping to rebuild the countries destroyed in World War II.
4
 On April 3, 
1948, President Harry Truman signed the Foreign Assistance Act 
(―FAA‖).5 This enacted legislation that put into force the Marshall Plan, a 
foreign assistance program that allowed Europe to reconstruct itself with 
American assistance.
6
 The Marshall Plan remained in place for nearly four 
years until December 31, 1951.
7
 Under the Marshall Plan, the United 
States gave $13.3 billion to Europe for economic recovery.
8
 
 
 
 3. In fact, many business people thought the Marshall Plan, discussed infra notes 4–10 and 
accompanying text, would also reduce the possibility of another Great Depression because it would 
boost exports. Library of Congress, For European Recovery: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Marshall 
Plan, Benefits for the U.S. Economy, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/mars11.html (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2009).  
 4. Library of Congress, For European Recovery: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan, 
Introduction, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall.mars0.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) [hereinafter 
Fiftieth Anniversary Introduction]. In signing the Foreign Assistance Act, Truman stated that the Act 
was ―America’s answer to the challenge facing the free world today.‖ Library of Congress, For 
European Recovery: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan, Truman Signs the Economic 
Assistance Act, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/mars3.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) 
[hereinafter Truman Signs the Act]. Truman also stated, ―Those who are skeptical of the effectiveness 
of a democratic system should ponder the lesson of the enactment of this measure. . . . It is an 
outstanding example of cooperative endeavor for the common good.‖ Statement by the President Upon 
Signing the Foreign Assistance Act, PUB. PAPERS 203 (Apr. 3, 1948). Ostensibly, the obvious 
undertone of this message was Truman responding to the Communist threat by saying that capitalism 
can also provide for the common good in a very effective manner. Opponents thought it would hinder 
the domestic economy, but the Communist revolution in Czechoslovakia ensured that Communist 
concerns overrode domestic concerns. Library of Congress, For European Recovery: The Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the Marshall Plan, Fears of Communist Domination, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/ 
marshall/mars2.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2009). In fact, the Marshall Plan initially involved the Soviet 
Union’s participation to avoid increasing tensions between it and the United States. Vince Crawley, 
Marshall Plan Placed Europe on Path Toward Unity (2007), http://www.america.gov/st/develop-
english/2007/May/20070522162259MVyelwarC0.7400019.html. However, Stalin denounced the 
invitation as a trick and declined the invitation. The Marshall Plan (1947): U.S. Invested $13 Billion 
Over Six Years to Revive Europe (2005), http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/April/ 
200504291439291CJsamohT0.6520502.html.  
 5. Truman Signs the Act, supra note 4. The Foreign Assistance Act was the legislation putting 
into place the Marshall Plan. Id. 
 6. Fiftieth Anniversary Introduction, supra note 4. The Marshall Plan was proposed by 
Secretary of State George Catlett Marshall with two major aims: (1) to prevent the spread of 
communism, and (2) to stabilize the post-World War II chaos in a manner favorable to democracy and 
capitalism. Id. The agency’s official name was the Economic Cooperation Administration, and the 
official name of the Marshall Plan was the European Recovery Program. THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 
RECORDS OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AGENCIES, 1948–1961, at 469.2, available at 
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/469.html [hereinafter ARCHIVES 1948–
1961]. 
 7. Library of Congress, For European Recovery: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan, 
Key Dates for the Marshall Plan, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/mars.html (last visited Apr. 16, 
2009) [hereinafter Fiftieth Anniversary, Key Dates]. In addition to the Foreign Assistance Act, the 
international community also established the International Monetary Fund (―IMF‖) and the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/7
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The Marshall Plan was actually terminated six months prior to its 
projected end date because of the escalating Korean War conflict.
9
 
Congress wanted to unite American military operations with economic 
programs and technical assistance.
10
 Thus, on October 31, 1951 Congress 
passed the Mutual Security Act,
11
 which achieved these goals by 
establishing the Mutual Security Agency with a controller heading the 
operations in each country.
12
 Soon thereafter, on August 1, 1953, a 
reorganization abolished the Mutual Security Agency and gave its 
functions to the Foreign Operations Administration.
13
 This new agency 
operated as an independent government agency outside the Department of 
State.
14
 Following this, on June 30, 1955, the International Cooperation 
Administration was created to take over the operations of the Foreign 
Operations Administration.
15
 However, unlike the Foreign Operations 
Administration, the International Cooperation Administration operated 
 
 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (―World Bank‖). USAID History, 
http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2008) [hereinafter USAID]. 
However, the World Bank and the IMF were intended to be permanent institutions, whereas the 
Marshall Plan was an emergency measure intended to have a limited duration ending when Europe 
stabilized. Id.  
 8. Fiftieth Anniversary, Key Dates, supra note 7.  
 9. Id. The Korean War began in June 1950. Id. 
 10. USAID, supra note 7.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Clark L. Simpson, Controls In Mutual Security Agency Abroad, 28 ACCT. REV. 79, 79 
(1953). The controller of the Mutual Security Agency (―Controller‖) had job responsibilities as 
controlling the amount expended and commodities furnished. Id. Notably, the Controller’s job was to 
―determine that the funds spent actually accomplish the purposes of the Act.‖ Id. Each country has a 
Controller who is under the technical supervision of a Controller in Paris, and all Controllers are under 
the authority of the Washington Controller. Id. Each Controller must determine the effectiveness of 
dollar aid using the categories of planning, payment, arrival, distribution, and end-use. Id. at 81. All 
allotments of funds are made in Washington. Id. A notable structural framework for accountability of 
funds exists because the Controller of each country must verify the arrival of goods in the country with 
the amount disbursed in Washington reports and ensure appropriate distribution of goods as well as 
proper use (e.g. making sure the recipient country does not re-export the goods). Id. at 81–82.  
 13. ARCHIVES, supra note 6. President Eisenhower stated:  
[The] Director of the Foreign Operations Administration is responsible for coordinating all 
operations of the foreign assistance programs. He should establish appropriate machinery to 
achieve this coordination and to assure that all aspects of the mutual security program are 
consistent with and further the attainment of foreign policy, military policy, and financial and 
monetary policy objectives. This should include provisions for the Secretaries of State, 
Defense, and Treasury to receive adequate reports on the operations and projected plans with 
respect to each program under the Mutual Security Act.  
Memorandum on the Administration of Foreign Aid Programs, PUB. PAPERS 1019 (Nov. 6, 1954) 
[hereinafter Eisenhower].  
 14. USAID, supra note 7. This organization also had a limited duration, and was intended to last 
through 1955 or until other foreign aid arrangements were made. Eisenhower, supra note 13.  
 15. ARCHIVES, supra note 6.  
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within the Department of State.
16
 A revised Mutual Security Act in 1957 
created the Development Loan Fund in order to act as the International 
Cooperation Administration’s lending arm.17  
Because none of these organizations met the need for a long-term 
foreign development program, under the statutory authorization of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Kennedy Administration created the 
United States Agency for International Development (―USAID‖) on 
November 3, 1961.
18
 The creation of USAID was based on three 
assumptions: (1) the current state of foreign assistance had not developed 
to meet the current needs of the United States and developing countries, 
(2) it is in the United States’ economic and security interests to avoid a 
collapse of developing countries, and (3) the post-World War shuffling of 
power structures across the world provided a unique opportunity for 
industrialized nations to create self-sustaining economies in under-
developed countries.
19
  
 
 
 16. USAID, supra note 7.  
 17. Id. The Development Loan Fund gave loans that many other donors were not interested in, 
particularly loans repayable in local currency. Id.  
 18. THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, RECORDS OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
[AID], at 286.1, available at http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/286.html 
[hereinafter RECORDS]. Because an increasing number of Americans were becoming dissatisfied with 
U.S. foreign assistance, foreign assistance reform was an issue in the 1960 presidential campaign. 
USAID, supra note 7. It was partially prompted by the book, The Ugly American, by Eugene Burdick 
and William Lederer. This book describes how the United States approach to foreign assistance 
arrogantly ignored the local culture, causing many developing countries to lean towards communism, 
contrary to the initial objective of the Marshall Plan. Id. 
 19. USAID, supra note 7. Kennedy’s statements are worth reading at length, particularly: 
For no objective supporter of foreign aid can be satisfied with the existing program—actually 
a multiplicity of programs. Bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow, its 
administration is diffused over a haphazard and irrational structure covering at least four 
departments and several other agencies. The program is based on a series of legislative 
measures and administrative procedures conceived at different times and for different 
purposes, many of them now obsolete, inconsistent, and unduly rigid and thus unsuited for 
our present needs and purposes. Its weaknesses have begun to undermine confidence in our 
effort both here and abroad. 
 Although our aid programs have helped to avoid economic chaos and collapse, and 
assisted many nations to maintain their independence and freedom—nevertheless, it is a fact 
that many of the nations we are helping are not much nearer sustained economic growth than 
they were when our aid operation began. Money spent to meet crisis situations or short-term 
political objectives while helping to maintain national integrity and independence has rarely 
moved the recipient nation toward greater economic stability. 
 The answer is that there is no escaping our obligations: our moral obligations as a wise 
leader and good neighbor in the interdependent community of free nations—our economic 
obligations as the wealthiest people in a world of largely poor people, as a nation no longer 
dependent upon the loans from abroad that once helped us develop our own economy—and 
our political obligations as the single largest counter to the adversaries of freedom.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/7
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The Foreign Assistance Act created two primary developmental 
programs: the Development Loan Fund to stimulate capital, and a 
Development Grant Fund to develop human resources.
20
 It also created 
three other important programs: insurance to protect businesses operating 
abroad from the risks involved in foreign investment, a program to 
promote economic and political stability, and an appropriated contingency 
fund.
21
 The main improvement of USAID over the previous foreign 
assistance efforts was that it allowed for country-specific planning and 
long-term development planning.
22
  
Because the Foreign Assistance Act contained few restrictions on how 
aid could be disbursed and failed to delineate specific factors to determine 
aid recipients, in the early 1970s the public again began to call for 
reform.
23
 Throughout the 1970s, the Foreign Assistance Act was renewed 
in various forms, often unenthusiastically signed into law by the 
President.
24
 A key reform in 1973 basically turned the Foreign Assistance 
Act to the state in which it remains today.
25
 The main change in the 1973 
reform was to replace the technical assistance and developmental loans 
 
 
 To fail to meet those obligations now would be disastrous; and, in the long run, more 
expensive. For widespread poverty and chaos lead to a collapse of existing political and social 
structures which would inevitably invite the advance of totalitarianism into every weak and 
unstable area. Thus our own security would be endangered and our prosperity imperiled. A 
program of assistance to the underdeveloped nations must continue because the Nation’s 
interest and the cause of political freedom require it.  
Id. 
 20. Id.  
 21. USAID, supra note 7. The insurance program is now called the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, and the stability program is currently called the Economic Support Fund. Id.  
 22. Id. One of the first programs offers an interesting look at the intentions of the newly created 
USAID. The Alliance for Progress was essentially a Marshall Plan for South America, except that it 
required government, land, and tax reform for countries that received funding. Department of State, 
Alliance for Progress and Peace Corps, 1961–1969, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/ea/17453.htm 
[hereinafter Alliance for Progress]. The U.S. government distributed nearly $10 billion of aid in the 
first six years of the program. Alliance for Urgency, TIME, Apr. 21 1967, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,843582-,00.html. However, the end result of the 
plan was a deterioration in the U.S.-Latin American relationship and a minimal impact of economic 
growth on the living conditions of the poor, a problem that persists to this day. Alliance for Progress, 
supra.  
 23. USAID, supra note 7. 
 24. See Statement on Signing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, 2 PUB. PAPERS 778 (Dec. 30, 
1974), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4660; Statement on Signing the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, PUB. PAPERS 166 (Feb. 7, 1972), available at http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3727. In his signing statement, Nixon declared: ―Viewed against the vital 
national objectives which our foreign assistance programs are designed to pursue, the act is a great 
disappointment. It severely cuts the amounts requested by the Administration for development 
assistance and security assistance and is below minimum acceptable levels.‖ Id.  
 25. USAID, supra note 7.  
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and grants with loans and grants targeted at specific categories, such as 
agriculture or education.
26
 
President Jimmy Carter instituted the next reform in 1979, creating the 
International Development Cooperation Agency (―IDCA‖).27 This changed 
the chain of authority from the previous system in which authority for all 
FAA programs was delegated by the President to the Secretary of State.
28
 
After the reform, the President delegated economic assistance programs to 
the Director of the IDCA, who then re-delegated them to the Director of 
USAID.
29
 Security assistance programs remained under the authority of 
the Secretary of State.
30
 The IDCA lacked the punch that Carter desired 
because it could only coordinate USAID, which included no more than 
seventy-five employees, and no other foreign aid efforts.
31
 The IDCA’s 
funding lapsed under the Reagan administration, and the last general 
foreign aid act was passed in 1985.
32
 Finally, in 1995, the Foreign Affairs 
Reform and Restructuring Act abolished the IDCA, while at the same time 
transforming USAID into a statutory agency from a statutorily authorized 
agency.
33
 
III. CURRENT FOREIGN AID FRAMEWORK: SYMBOLIC, BUT NOT 
STRUCTURAL, CHANGE 
On March 14, 2002, President George W. Bush delivered an address 
calling for a ―new compact for global development‖ with the purpose of 
creating accountability in foreign countries that receive aid.
34
 His speech 
trumpeted a message that has persisted in foreign aid discourse since 
Kennedy in 1961, namely that foreign aid must be ―defined by new 
accountability for both rich and poor nations alike. Greater contributions 
 
 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. This was created by Executive Order 12147 on July 19, 1979. See Exec. Order No. 
12,147, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,957 (July 19, 1979), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
index.php?pid=32618. Carter’s reform was very similar to a reform proposed, but never enacted into 
law, by Hubert Humphrey. USAID, supra note 7.  
 28. USAID, supra note 7. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. NOAM UNGER, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REFORM: THEN, NOW 
AND AROUND THE BEND 6 (2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/ 
2007/07foreignassistance_unger/200707unger.pdf. The last foreign assistance act was called The 
International Security and Development Cooperation Act. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. OECD, THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT FACT SHEET 2 (2002) [hereinafter FACT 
SHEET], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/38/33692015.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/7
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from developed nations must be linked to greater responsibility from 
developing nations.‖35 Bush promised an increase of 50 percent ($5 
billion) in its core development assistance by 2006,
36
 with funds placed 
into a Millennium Challenge Account (―MCA‖) and controlled by the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (―MCC‖).37  
The MCC looks to sixteen indicators in determining which of the 
eligible countries will receive funding.
38
 The indicators are intended to 
reward nations that root out corruption, respect human rights, and 
adhere to the rule of law . . . invest in better health care, better 
schools and broader immunization . . . [and] have more open 
markets and sustainable budget policies, nations where people can 
start and operate a small business without running the gauntlets of 
bureaucracy and bribery.
39
 
However, the MCA remains only a part of the overall foreign aid 
system in the United States. In general, foreign aid can be categorized into 
five groups: bilateral development aid, economic assistance for the 
purposes of furthering U.S. political and security goals, humanitarian aid, 
multilateral economic contributions, and military aid.
40
 As a whole, 
 
 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. The Treasury Department is responsible for disbursing all funding, as well as for the 
United States’ participation in the World Bank. CURT TARNOFF & LARRY NOWELS, FOREIGN AID: AN 
INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (Apr. 15, 
2004), at CRS-22, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31987.pdf.  
 37. FACT SHEET, supra note 34. The MCA will be administered by a Millennium Challenge 
Corporation. Id. The MCC will be governed by a Board of Directors composed of cabinet-level 
officials, with the Secretary of State as Chairman of the Board. Id. The CEO of the MCC will be 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Id. Personnel will be experts hired from both 
governmental and non-governmental positions for a limited duration. Id. MCC’s mission is to reduce 
global poverty through the promotion of sustainable economic growth. Millennium Challenge 
Corporation, About MCC, http://www.mcc.gov/about/index.php (last visited Feb. 14, 2008). The 
statutory authorization for these agencies comes from Public Law 108-199. 
 38. FACT SHEET, supra note 34 (internal quotation omitted). The criteria for eligible countries 
changed each of the first three years. Id. In 2004, all countries eligible to borrow from the International 
Development Association (―IDA‖) with per capita incomes under $1,435 were eligible to receive 
funds from the MCC. Id. In 2005 the IDA requirement was dropped. Id. In 2006 the per capita income 
minimum was raised to match that of World Bank, which is $2,975. Id. 
 39. FACT SHEET, supra note 34. The sixteen indicators fall into three categories. Under 
―governing justly‖ are civil liberties, political rights, voice and accountability, government 
effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption. Under ―investing in people‖ are public primary 
education spending as a percentage of GDP, primary education completion rate, public expenditures 
on health as a percentage of GDP, and immunization rates for DPT and measles. Under ―promoting 
economic freedom‖ are country credit rating, inflation, three-year budget deficit, trade policy, 
regulatory quality, and days to start a business. Id.  
 40. TARNOFF & NOWELS, supra note 36. Bilateral assistance is the largest category of foreign 
aid, with Congress appropriating $6.2 billion in 2004, and most of the funds in this category are 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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foreign aid comes from over twenty different sources from the federal 
government, with USAID being the most prominent.
41
  
USAID is managed by the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance 
(―DFA‖), who, as of 2009, is Randall Tobias. He also has the task of 
―directing the transformation‖ of America’s approach to foreign aid.42 This 
position was created as part of a 2006 reform of America’s foreign aid 
structure, an attempt to centralize and rationalize our foreign aid with the 
needs of the twenty-first century.
43
 The new Director of Foreign 
Assistance created five core objectives for U.S. foreign aid: (1) peace and 
security, (2) governing justly, (3) investing in people, (4) economic 
growth, and (5) humanitarian assistance.
44
 He also created five categories 
in which to place countries: (1) restrictive countries, (2) rebuilding 
countries, (3) developing countries, (4) transforming countries, and (5) 
sustaining partnership countries.
45
 The end goal of the United States for 
countries in each category is to advance them to the subsequent category, 
with sustaining partnership countries being the final goal before removal 
from the foreign aid program altogether.
46
  
 
 
managed by USAID. Id. Economic aid supporting political and security objectives is the next largest 
category, with $5.4 billion worth of assistance in 2004. Id. Most ($3 billion) of these funds are 
administered through the Economic Support Fund, which primarily supports countries deemed 
important in the War on Terror. Id. Congress appropriated $2.55 billion for humanitarian assistance, 
$1.7 billion for multilateral assistance, and $4.8 billion for military assistance in 2004. Id.  
 41. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION, OBJECTIVES AND 
ORGANIZATIONS (2006), available at http://www3.brookings.edu/global/foreign_reform_chart.pdf. 
 42. U.S. Department of State, Director of Foreign Assistance, http://www.state.gov/f/ (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2008). The Director of U.S. foreign assistance holds a rank equivalent to Deputy 
Secretary of State and has authority over all Department of State and USAID foreign assistance 
funding and programs. Id.  
 43. Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, New Direction for U.S. Foreign Assistance, Jan. 19, 
2006 [hereinafter New Direction], available at http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2006/sp060119 
_1.html. In announcing the reform, Condoleezza Rice stated:  
The current structure of America’s foreign assistance risks incoherent policies and ineffective 
programs and perhaps even wasted resources. We can do better and we must do better. We 
must align our activities more fully across the State Department and USAID and within the 
State Department itself. Increasing this alignment will enable us to be better stewards of 
public resources. We are dedicating record amounts of the American people’s money to our 
international efforts and it is incumbent upon us to spend that money responsibly and 
effectively. America’s taxpayers must know that we are using their hard-earned dollars 
efficiently and effectively to improve our own security, but also to improve people’s lives 
around the world. 
Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Foreign Assistance (Jan. 19, 2006) [hereinafter 
Remarks on Foreign Assistance], available at http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/nss/state/59408.pdf. 
 44. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK, available at http://www.state. 
gov/documents/organization/79748.pdf [hereinafter FRAMEWORK]. 
 45. Id. The Director also created a ―regional‖ category for issues that transcend a single country’s 
borders. Id.  
 46. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/7
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IV. GLOBALIZATION OF A WELFARE MENTALITY AND OTHER FOREIGN 
AID ISSUES 
Despite the persistent and recurring reforms in foreign aid, many 
problems remain with the U.S. foreign assistance setup. The 2006 reform 
attempts to bring coherence to U.S. foreign aid, but neglects one of the 
most important aspects that U.S. foreign aid has consistently had: 
alleviation of poverty. In Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s announcement of 
the 2006 reform, she failed to even mention poverty alleviation as a goal 
of the U.S. foreign aid program; instead, she outlined the benefits that 
democracy (stimulated via foreign aid) would have for the United States 
and its security.
47
 Concededly, Secretary Rice had a point: the security 
interests of the United States are in fact promoted by having stable 
societies.  
The issue, however, is whether using foreign aid as an explicit national 
security tool will create stable governments. A report by Stewart Patrick 
from the Center for Global Development succinctly explains the issue:  
[D]evelopment is . . . a worthwhile end in . . . itself . . . . It also 
requires long-term engagement with entire societies . . . . Indeed, 
too close an alignment with U.S. national security policy, or too 
explicit an intent to change governing structures of host nations, can 
undermine the perceived neutrality, credibility and generosity of 
U.S. development efforts . . . .
48
 
Additionally, there remains the question of whether the 2006 reforms 
in fact reduced the amount of incoherence in our foreign aid reform. 
Notably, although the DFA position was designed to bring coherence and 
consistency to our foreign aid setup, it lacks the capacity to do so under 
the current reform. There are four main limitations to the Director’s 
 
 
 47. Remarks on Foreign Assistance, supra note 43. Secretary Rice stated:  
Foreign assistance is an essential component of our transformational diplomacy. In today’s 
world, America’s security is linked to the capacity of foreign states to govern justly and 
effectively. Our foreign assistance must help people get results. . . . [O]n September 11th, we 
were attacked by terrorists who had plotted and trained in a failed state, Afghanistan. Since 
then, we have cycled tens of thousands of troops through that country, spent billions of 
dollars and sacrificed precious lives to eliminate the threat and to liberate the brutally 
repressed people of Afghanistan. But Afghanistan is an example. We know, too, that we must 
use our foreign assistance in places like Afghanistan not only to complete the job that we 
have begun there, but to prevent future failed states like Afghanistan was.  
Id.  
 48. STEWART PATRICK, CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, US FOREIGN AID REFORM: WILL 
IT FIX WHAT IS BROKEN 10 (2006), http://www.cgdev.org/files/10497_file_Foreign_ Aid_Reform.pdf.  
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authority. The Director cannot: (1) shift funds between USAID and the 
State Department, (2) roll back outdated Congressional earmarks on funds, 
(3) coordinate the independent MCA, and (4) assert authority over any of 
the other sources of foreign aid in our government.
49
 
Furthermore, the relationship between the MCC and USAID remains 
unclear. An example of the problems caused by this ambiguous 
relationship are seen with U.S. aid to Tanzania. USAID used to be the 
leader in development efforts in Tanzania.
50
 But now MCC has taken the 
lead, and there is not adequate communication between USAID and MCC 
in order to provide guidance during the transition process.
51
 This 
experience has been duplicated in many developing countries during the 
early years of the MCC.
52
 In particular, in many countries the MCC 
restricted the ability of USAID to provide proposals for development, and 
the MCC relied on USAID for logistical support but not for planning 
purposes.
53
 This not only creates problems in delivering foreign assistance, 
but it creates tension between the two organizations—inevitable anytime 
someone’s job and power is given to someone else to whom they are then 
subservient.
54
 
 
 
 49. Id. at 6. The Director technically has the ability to reallocate funds between the State 
Department and USAID, but is limited by the multitude of accounts within these bureaucracies, as the 
Director needs Congressional approval to move funds out of a specific account and will face enough 
red tape and political games that make it practically impossible to do so. Id. at 6–7. The Director also 
lacks the power to control 21% of foreign aid funds because they fall out of his authority, and the 
increasing role of the Department of Defense in counterterrorism, reconstruction, and humanitarian 
assistance correspondingly takes power away from the Director and the State Department. Id. at 7. 
 50. THE CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, MCA MONITOR: TANZANIA FIELD REPORT 8 
(2006), available at http://www.cgdev.org/doc/MCA/Tanzaniafieldreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 
2008) [hereinafter TANZANIA FIELD REPORT]. Additionally, there was no clear discussion among 
USAID, MCC, or Washington of how the roles were changing. Without a clear discussion of the 
change in responsibilities, there will either be overlapping efforts or areas which both organizations 
neglect, thinking the other one will take care of it. Id. at 7–8. 
 51. Id. A government official in Tanzania said that USAID provided invaluable guidance to the 
government during a previous foreign aid program because USAID ―understands Washington better 
than we do and they understand Tanzania better than Washington does.‖ He went on to say that 
USAID would provide invaluable guidance to MCC during the transition phase, but ―no clear or 
formal structure‖ is in place to help MCC. Id. at 8. 
 52. Id. at 8. 
 53. Id. It would be beneficial for both to work together. USAID has the experience necessary to 
implement many programs, in terms of ―the delicacies of working with a given set of government 
officials, navigating donor relations, and identifying reliable civil society partners.‖ Id. at 8. The MCC 
brings a new mindset to the process, which emphasizes efficiency, monitoring, evaluation, and 
fostering self-reliance. USAID has reported that these underlying viewpoints have fostered creative 
ideas in their organization as well. Id. at 8. 
 54. Apparently, after three years of working together, the ―animosity‖ in the relationship between 
USAID and MCC is abating. However, they do not have a clearly defined relationship on which to 
build for the future. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/7
  
 
 
 
 
2009] U.S. FOREIGN AID REFORM 757 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Patrick also suggests several other problems with the reform. In 
particular, he asserts that the reform fails to express a strategy in many 
failing states, it fails to reinforce civilian leadership, it increases the 
difficulty of partnering with other donors and local actors, and it fails to 
establish a framework for monitoring and evaluation of foreign aid 
programs.
55
 
There are also many questions regarding the inherent effectiveness of 
aid. For example, a study by the Joint Economic Committee of the House 
of Representatives determined that International Monetary Fund (―IMF‖) 
assistance can actually increase corruption.
56
 It listed several reasons for 
this contrary result: foreign aid can strengthen the government relative to 
the private sector, it can strengthen existing corruption, and it can delay 
pressures for reform.
57
  
There is ample anecdotal evidence to support the proposition that much 
of the aid does not actually reach its intended recipients. The United 
 
 
 55. PATRICK, supra note 48, at 2. The report puts most fragile states into the category of 
―developing‖ countries for diplomatic reasons. Id. at 11–12. The author of the report describes the first 
issue: 
Besides being inconsistent with the administration’s espoused strategic concern with weak 
and failing states, this lacuna suggests that the United States has a reactive policy toward war-
torn countries and a punitive one toward rogue states, while lacking a preventive strategy to 
stop struggling states from sliding toward either abyss. 
Id. at 12. Demonstrating the lack of civilian leadership, Bush issued National Security Presidential 
Directive Forty-Four, with Iraq in mind, to give the Secretary of State the power to ―stabilize and 
reconstruct‖ war-torn countries via civilians. Id. However, Congress refused to provide appropriate 
resources, so the Department of Defense took over these duties despite the fact that military aid in this 
respect encourages ―unsustainable, externally imposed interventions and tar[s] reconstruction efforts 
with a military brush.‖ Id. at 12. The third problem exists because American foreign aid still suffers 
from a top-down mentality, thus making it difficult to institute local priorities. Id. at 13–14. 
Additionally, because the United States tends to act unilaterally, a large American effort in one area, 
highly concentrated due to the potential of increased coherence in U.S. foreign aid, will undermine and 
alienate other international donors who may have other goals. Id. The inability to exercise oversight 
and monitor funds will be discussed infra.  
 56. U.S. CONGRESS JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE STUDY, CAN IMF LENDING PROMOTE 
CORRUPTION? 1 (1999) (containing the expert opinion of Robert Keleher, Chief Macroeconomist to 
the Vice Chairman of the JEC, Jim Saxton (R-NJ)), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/ 
corrupt.pdf. 
 57. Id. The paper stated:  
[F]oreign aid can create incentives to maintain existing institutions and inhibit reform; foreign 
aid can work to further entrench the status quo. Foreign aid, for example, may inhibit efforts 
to reform for several reasons. As countries come to expect economic aid from external 
sources, the impetus to develop the necessary preconditions for advancement may dissipate. 
Necessary efforts to reform attitudes, institutions, and incentive structures, and to minimize 
corruption may become subordinate to efforts to obtain such aid. The availability of foreign 
aid therefore may spawn efforts to obtain this external aid instead of efforts to develop the 
necessary, essential ingredients for corruption-free internally driven growth. 
Id. at 4. 
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Nations Oil-for-Food scandal was meant to provide humanitarian aid to 
the people of Iraq, but Saddam Hussein’s regime took an estimated $10 
billion from the program.
58
 Also, warlords repeatedly stole food donated 
by foreign aid organizations such as USAID, which was destined for 
Afghan refugees in 2002.
59
 More recently, the adoption scandal in Chad
60
 
and the sexual abuse scandal in Haiti
61
 have involved even the workers on 
the ground. This is not to say that most of the workers or aid programs are 
corrupt, but that the large number of high-profile abuses can be indicative 
of more problems and can undo positive work by turning local opinion 
against the aid agencies. These high-profile foreign aid abuses can also 
change the American perception of the good that foreign aid provides. 
One final and important problem with our foreign aid setup is the lack 
of oversight after funds are disbursed. For example, the United States 
gives over $100 million to the United Nations Relief Work Agency 
(―UNRWA‖) with absolutely no oversight on the funds.62 The UNRWA 
does not even allow the United States to look at its books to see where the 
money goes.
63
 This is a common problem, but one that has serious 
repercussions. For example, several UNRWA staff ran for political office 
in Parliament in the Palestinian territory as Hamas candidates.
64
 Not only 
is this plainly bad foreign policy, it is in direct contravention of United 
 
 
 58. Nile Gardiner & James Phillips, Investigate the United Nations Oil-for-Food Fraud, 
BACKGROUNDER (The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 21, 2004, at 1, available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/62155_1.pdf. 
 59. C.J. Chivers, A Nation Challenged: Aid Groups; Aid Groups Say Warlords Steal as Needy 
Wait, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2002, at A1. 
 60. French Held Over Chad ‘Adoptions’, BBC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
africa/7063324.stm. 
 61. UN Troops Face Child Abuse Claims, BBC NEWS, Nov. 30, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/americas/6195830.stm.  
 62. Press Release, The Online Office of Congressman Steve Rothman, Demanding Stricter 
Oversight of Foreign Aid (Sept. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Rothman], available at http://www.rothman. 
house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=213&Itemid=84. This report was a 
bipartisan effort created by Representatives Steve Rothman (D-NJ) and Mark Kirk (R-IL), members of 
the House Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. Id. This Subcommittee 
makes all decisions about U.S. foreign aid, thus placing Mr. Rothman and Mr. Kirk in a unique 
position to understand the implications of blindly doling out money. Id. The report was sent to 
Condoleezza Rice, who, as Secretary of State, has responsibility for all Foreign Aid Assistance 
programs. Id.  
 63. Id. Although the United States was not allowed to audit the books of UNRWA, the United 
Nations’ internal auditors reported inconsistencies in a study that has not yet been made public. Id. The 
inconsistencies included ―unaccounted for expenditures,‖ ―records that do not correspond to actual 
payments made by UNRWA,‖ and $46.5 million in loans to UNRWA staff. Id. There is no record on 
how the loans are being repaid, or even ―exactly how much is owed.‖ Id.  
 64. Id. 
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States law, which prohibits taxpayer dollars from supporting listed 
terrorist organizations.
65
 
The lack of oversight goes hand-in-hand with our inability to monitor 
results after the foreign aid is disbursed.
66
 This is a perpetual problem with 
American foreign aid because our government tends to ―measure[] inputs 
and outputs rather than impacts or outcomes.‖67 Although the newly 
created Director of Foreign Assistance is mandated to evaluate our foreign 
aid program against our objectives, there appears to be no shift away from 
merely measuring inputs and outputs.
68
 This problem is magnified when 
there appears to be no consensus among local NGOs, the newly created 
Director of Foreign Assistance (―DFA‖), academia, and the public about 
what an effective measuring stick would be.
69
 One obvious solution would 
 
 
 65. Id. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States Department of State. 
OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, FACTSHEET: FOREIGN TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS (FTOS) (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm. The 
UNRWA does not even check its donees against a list of known terrorists. Rothman, supra note 62. 
Thus, although this still needs to be investigated further to be verified, it demonstrates the problems 
accompanied by blindly distributing money to organizations and foreign countries. 
 66. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR FOR U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
ABOUT U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE REFORM (2006), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/ 
PCAAB573.pdf. The issue of oversight is simply dismissed in this question and answer exchange:  
Will the public be able to measure the success of foreign assistance? Yes, in fact, one of the 
major aims of this reform is to strengthen our ability to measure and communicate the impact 
of our foreign assistance funding to the American People, Congress, and those we seek to 
assist. We expect to put forth indicators that will allow us to compare performances across 
countries, programs, and partners.‖  
Id.  
 67. PATRICK, supra note 48, at 15. An example will help clarify this distinction. Hypothetically, 
USAID donates $100,000 to Nepal to build a dam in order to harness hydroelectric power for the 
purpose of bringing electricity to very poor rural villages. The input is $100,000 donated to a local 
strongman who happens to run an NGO, which facially looks legitimate. The dam is then built by the 
strongman, perhaps a Maoist who fought in Nepal’s civil war to overthrow the government. He puts 
$60,000 towards the dam, and the dam produces enough electricity to power the village each night. 
The output measured is the electricity. Thus, under the current United States evaluation, everything 
would look all right: we give money, a dam is built, and the village has electricity. But this ignores the 
overall impact of the aid. The local strongman uses the other $40,000 to purchase arms and buy up 
local villagers’ land. He begins extracting extravagant rents and uses the guns to subdue uncooperative 
villagers. Thus, the overall impact of the foreign aid is that a village has electricity, but the villagers 
have lost a certain amount of freedom in exchange for the electricity. And given that the local 
strongman is a Maoist, it threatens the stability of the central government, which is attempting to shift 
from a monarchy to a democracy. The possibility of instability is completely contrary to the goals of 
our foreign aid. 
 68. Id. The DFA did create five core objectives: peace and security, governing justly and 
democratically, investing in people, economic growth, and humanitarian assistance. FRAMEWORK, 
supra note 44. But the DFA has not released what indicators it will use to monitor and evaluate 
progress towards the goals. 
 69. PATRICK, supra note 48, at 4. DFA officials have started to make a greater effort to find 
appropriate measures by asking NGOs and policy experts. Id. 
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be for the United States to simply send aid workers to evaluate the books 
and projects of aid recipients to ensure the money goes where it ought to. 
But this would be overbearing, inefficient, and prone to corruption.
70
 
Thus, the MCA and other recent reforms are a step in the right 
direction. They both address and keep the problems surrounding foreign 
aid disbursement in the public consciousness. These reforms attempt to 
solve some of the problems that foreign aid programs have continuously 
encountered. Many of the problems, however, are institutional and 
inherent in any foreign aid program. Thus, an institutional overhaul of our 
foreign aid program is necessary to truly achieve its objectives. 
V. A LEGITIMATE REFORM REQUIRES SYSTEMIC CHANGE 
One of the most common proposals for foreign aid reform calls for the 
establishment of a cabinet-level department that would run development 
programs.
71
 However, not only would this not solve many of the 
institutional problems of foreign aid, it would create many more. The only 
saving graces of a cabinet-level department for foreign development 
would be that it would increase the visibility of foreign aid efforts and it 
would streamline those efforts. Visibility would be increased because a 
cabinet-level position would be closer to the president and thus subject to 
more media scrutiny. Thus, a cabinet-level position would entail more 
responsibility and more criticism.  
But the problems of oversight, corruption in foreign countries, 
harmonization with foreign donors, and creating sustainability in local 
communities, among other problems, would still exist.
72
 Furthermore, a 
cabinet-level position would make foreign aid an extremely political issue 
 
 
 70. See id. at 15 (―[There are] inherent disincentives to objective in-house monitoring and 
evaluation.‖). The article goes on to suggest that the Secretary of State establish an independent 
evaluation authority in order to monitor and oversee our foreign aid. Id. However, this would suffer 
from the same institutional problems that we currently have. If it is based in Washington, it will be too 
far away from the locale of aid recipients to have an idea of the impact it is having. If it travels to the 
geographic areas that receive much aid, it will impose some of the overbearing characteristics that our 
program is designed to avoid. 
 71. See, e.g., Videotape: Reforming U.S. Foreign Aid (2007), http://www.brookings.edu/ 
multimedia/video/2007/1210_brainard_HELP.aspx; PATRICK, supra note 48, at 16. The Center for 
Global Development author, Stewart Patrick, calls for the creation of the ―Department for International 
Development,‖ which he says would ―place development on a stronger footing within the U.S. 
executive branch, befitting its growing importance to U.S. foreign policy.‖ Id. at 16. Apparently the 
British have created this department already. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, U.S. FOREIGN AID: THE 
NEED FOR FUNDAMENTAL REFORM 47 (2007), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/ 
0727development/0727development.pdf. 
 72. See supra notes 48–70 and accompanying text. 
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and increase the possibility that only political allies would get aid.
73
 By 
giving only political allies aid, we would further alienate countries that 
lack a good relationship with the United States. In addition, given that our 
goal of foreign assistance is, among other things, to eliminate poverty and 
increase stability of developing countries, political alliances should not 
factor into any sort of foreign aid equation.
74
  
The solution for foreign aid must ensure that there is accountability for 
the funds disbursed,
75
 and that the funds are being used effectively.
76
 
Moreover, our foreign assistance program must be amended to improve 
reaction time in humanitarian crises.
77
 Finally, the United States must 
remove the condition that countries receiving foreign must also accept 
policies that the United States deems acceptable.
78
  
 
 
 73. United States Commission on Helping to Enhance the Livelihood of People, http://www.help 
commission.gov/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2008). 
 74. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 75. This is to say that the funds should not be enriching dictators, warlords, gangs, or others that 
will use them to oppress others. See, e.g., supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 76. Although this is similar to accountability, I have used it distinctly here. Accountability means 
that the funds reach their intended target. Effectiveness means that, when the aid reaches its intended 
target, it produces the desired effect. For example, suppose $250,000 is intended to provide improved 
medical care to residents of San Jose, Costa Rica. If the funds are used to actually build and staff a 
medical facility, then the accountability test is satisfied. If, instead, $100,000 is used to build a shoddy, 
understaffed facility and $150,000 is used for a residential project designed to enrich the funds 
recipient then there is no accountability in the funds’ use unless the recipient is punished. To look at 
effectiveness, one needs to look at the effect the hospital has on the medical care of its target 
community. If the appropriate facility is built, but the child mortality rate, for example, in the 
surrounding area increases, then the funds are not effective. If a quality facility is constructed and the 
child mortality rate, or other appropriate indicators of health, improve, then the funds are both 
accountable and effective.  
 77. Humanitarian crises can include natural disasters. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, After Tsunami, 
a Rarity: Donated Dollars Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at Sec. 1, Column 5. They can also be 
manmade calamities, such as conflict or war. See, e.g., Lydia Polgreen, Attacks Pushing Darfur 
Refugees Into Chad, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2008, at A3. 
 78. For example, the United States has determined that particular drugs should be illegal within 
its national borders. Without considering the validity of this domestic policy, it is wrong to force the 
U.S. ―war on drugs‖ onto other countries that may or may not have the same problems as the United 
States. This is at best a kind of forced hegemony, and at worst sleight-of-hand imperialism, forcing 
U.S. laws and policies onto other countries. It is probably somewhere in between, but the United States 
simply cannot eliminate a problem within its borders by mandating that everyone else must stop it, too. 
See, e.g., IAN VÁSQUEZ, THE CATO INSTITUTE, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 108TH 
CONGRESS, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-56.pdf (advocating 
elimination of the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988 which condition foreign aid on the 
―adoption of narcotics control initiatives in foreign countries‖). Although this may seem like a wedge 
issue, the United Nations reports that drugs and terrorism have a strong link, with America’s refusal to 
eliminate the black market for drugs profiting drug gangs, including terrorist organizations, $400 
billion a year. See Terrorism, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE NETWORK (last updated July 19, 2004), 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/global/terrorism.  
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Increasing effectiveness and accountability, however, is more easily 
said than done. I propose that each embassy, or consulate in countries that 
do not have an embassy, receive an employee in charge of distributing 
foreign aid for that country. For purposes of this Note, I will call that 
position ―foreign aid country coordinator‖ (―FACC‖).79 All foreign aid 
disbursed by the United States government would have to go through the 
FACC.
80
 The FACC would be responsible for selecting aid recipients and 
approving projects.
81
 The coordinator would also have the responsibility of 
periodically inspecting these projects and their budgets to ensure that the 
funds are being used appropriately; that is, the FACC would ensure 
accountability for the funds. The coordinator would also be in a good 
position to notice misuse of the funds.
82
 
The FACC would report to the Director of Foreign Aid in Washington. 
The Director would be responsible for disbursing funds to each country.
83
 
 
 
 79. This position would be similar to that of the MSA Controller, discussed supra note 12, except 
with expanded powers. Rather than simply auditing books and coordinating distribution of goods, he 
would have a role in deciding what projects are funded by United States foreign aid. See infra notes 
80–82 and accompanying text. 
 80. That is to say that aid funded by private organizations would not be covered by this person, at 
least initially. There would probably be a backlash among NGOs and private organizations if this were 
to occur. Additionally, there would be significant coordination difficulties in trying to determine what 
exactly is foreign aid. For example, Merck selling drugs in Africa at no profit could easily be 
determined to be foreign aid. But if Unilever sold basic health care products, which can prevent much 
disease, at a very small profit, it would probably not be considered foreign aid. However, the 
difference between the two is marginal: both are American corporations selling products at a price of 
their choosing to impoverished foreign countries. In addition, Merck’s decision not to make a profit on 
the drugs could be profitable in the long run by giving them market recognition and creating barriers to 
entry for other companies. Military aid would also have to be excluded from the coordinator’s control 
for obvious reasons. 
 81. The way the process often works is that USAID will put out a notice that there are available 
foreign aid funds. The funds have criteria or objectives attached to them. Then local or international 
NGOs will submit plans meeting the criteria for the funds to USAID in an attempt to receive the funds. 
USAID will review the plans before selecting who will receive the money. For example, USAID will 
issue a notice that it has money available to help improve disadvantaged communities’ standard of 
living in Kenya. Three NGOs might submit plans calling for, respectively, construction of women’s 
shelters in villages across the community to receive battered women, construction of schools to 
educate minority tribes in remote villages, and education of public officials on the importance of 
respecting the rights of minorities. USAID might then decide that the battered women’s shelters plan is 
the most feasible and deliver the funds to that NGO.  
 82. For example, the DFA would have a working relationship with many of the aid recipients, 
and thus, would be in a position to notice significant changes in the standard of living of the recipients. 
If an NGO director previously went to work in Hanoi on a bicycle but, after receiving funds to 
improve drinking water, suddenly had an automobile, the coordinator would have a legitimate 
suspicion that the funds were being misused.  
 83. Some countries need more aid than others, and the DFA would have to make these decisions. 
Although it would be difficult to insulate the DFA from political pressures, a mandate should be issued 
declaring the position to be non-partisan, which would allow the DFA to ignore much pressure. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss4/7
  
 
 
 
 
2009] U.S. FOREIGN AID REFORM 763 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, the Director would strategically place regional coordinators 
who supervise the country-specific coordinators.
84
  
This setup would provide oversight for our funding, which is necessary 
to ensure its proper use and create sustainable communities. It would also 
allow for international and regional cooperation in tackling problems that 
transcend national boundaries. A regional director would also have the 
effect of eliminating duplicative efforts in countries when a regional effort 
would more effectively solve problems. 
VI. FOREIGN AID: CAN’T LIVE WITH IT, CAN’T LIVE WITHOUT IT 
In conclusion, America has a moral duty to provide foreign aid to poor 
and developing countries. As the standard of living in the United States 
relies on consuming cheap goods and services provided by many 
developing countries, such as India, Poland, and Mexico, it also has an 
economic incentive to create stability by ensuring a minimum standard of 
living. As such, the United States cannot simply eliminate its foreign aid 
program. 
However, the United States also has a duty to ensure that its foreign aid 
does not create more problems than it solves by enriching warlords, or by 
ineffectually and inefficiently responding to humanitarian crises when 
such response is critical. As it is, the United States’ current ad hoc foreign 
aid setup does not meet these needs. 
Creation of national foreign aid coordinators coupled with regional 
coordinators would be a tremendous step towards ensuring accountability 
and effectiveness of America’s foreign aid dollars, while ensuring prompt 
responses to humanitarian crises and eliminating duplicative efforts for 
international and regional issues. 
Stephen J. Wiese  
 
 
 84. A regional coordinator is necessary because some aid is best used by coordinating beyond 
political boundaries. For example, Darfur refugees are spilling into Chad. See A Regime Saved, for the 
Moment, ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2008, at 53. In order to adequately handle the situation, the coordinator 
from Sudan and Chad would need to synchronize their efforts. A regional coordinator would facilitate 
this. The DFA would place the regional coordinator in a stable country, preferably centrally located, 
within a particular region. Ghana would be a good location for a Western African regional coordinator. 
Costa Rica would be a good location for a Central American regional coordinator. 
  Stephen Wiese is a JD/MBA candidate (2010) at Washington University in St. Louis. He 
earned a B.A. in Communications Studies and Spanish from Vanderbilt University. 
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